Incorporation of deficiency data into the analysis of the dependency and interdependency among the risk factors influencing port state control inspection by Wang, Y et al.
Wang, Y, Zhang, F, Yang, Z and Yang, Z
 Incorporation of deficiency data into the analysis of the dependency and 




LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the 
University more effectively. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by 
the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of 
any article(s) in LJMU Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research.
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or 
any commercial gain.
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of the record. 
Please see the repository URL above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
For more information please contact researchonline@ljmu.ac.uk
http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/
Citation (please note it is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you 
intend to cite from this work) 
Wang, Y, Zhang, F, Yang, Z and Yang, Z (2020) Incorporation of deficiency 
data into the analysis of the dependency and interdependency among the 
risk factors influencing port state control inspection. Reliability Engineering




Incorporation of deficiency data into the analysis of the dependency and 
interdependency among the risk factors influencing port state control 
inspection  
ABSTRACT 
Port State Control (PSC) inspection aids to control substandard ships and ensure safety at 
sea. Current risk-based PSC research and practice fail to incorporate ship deficiency 
records into detention probability analysis, because of the difficulty introduced by the 
involved big deficiency data. In this paper, a new Bayesian Network (BN) based PSC risk 
probabilistic model is developed to analyze the dependency and interdependency among 
the risk factors influencing PSC inspections based on big data derived from the inspection 
database of Tokyo MoU for the period between 2014 and 2017. The results reveal that 
ship’s safety condition related deficiencies as well as technical features of the inspected 
vessel itself are among the most influential factors concerning PSC inspections and ship 
detention. New Bayesian learning methods are used to improve the model efficiency in 
ship detention prediction. As a result, the newly developed model has shown a reliable 
performance on dynamic prediction and cause-effect diagnosis of ship detention 
probabilities by pioneering the incorporation of ship deficiency records in the analysis. The 
findings provide important insights on how to facilitate risk-based PSC inspections for both 
ship owners and port states. They provide support for port state authorities to implement 
rational inspection policies. 
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The sustainable development of maritime transport plays a significant role in promoting 
international trade, and in consequence serves as the driving force of world economic 
prosperity. However, catastrophic maritime accidents seriously affect the sustainability of 
international trade due to their social and economic impacts [30][7][20][1]. For instance, 
the spill of Amoco Cadiz oil tanker caused 230,000 tons of crude oil to leak into the sea 
and the grounding of the Aegean Sea seriously polluted the local beach and caused serious 
depression of local tourism business. To ensure maritime safety, along with the joint efforts 
made by shipowners, classification societies and flag state administrations, the Port State 
Control (PSC) inspection came into the scene for controlling substandard ships[19][26][4].  
PSC inspection is carried out by port state authorities with the objective of ensuring the 
calling foreign vessels to meet the requirements of safety and pollution regulations. It 
consists of various inspection aspects, including the safety of life and property on board, 
prevention of pollution, living and working conditions and so on. If any serious deficiencies 
were found, the ship would be detained and instructed to rectify the deficiencies before its 
departure.  
In recent years, many studies assessing the interaction of factors influencing safety have 
been conducted in the maritime transportation field (e.g. [41][50][42]). Most of them are 
associated with ship navigational safety assurance, which leaves a gap in the relevant 
studies of risk-based PSC inspection area [48][49]. Few pioneering studies have been 
undertaken by utilizing PSC inspection data (e.g. [38][24][21]), and fewer have 
quantitatively addressed the interactions among the influential factors. Actually, in practice, 
the identified deficiency of a particular influential factor is often associated with the 
deficiencies of its relevant factors. In this paper, when one factor is influenced by other 
factors, this one-directional relationship is defined as dependency. When two factors 
influence each other, this bi-directional relationship is defined as interdependency.  [12]. 
In addition, due to the uncertainty in the PSC data, previous studies often use partial risk 
factors for which the relevant data can be obtained to conduct PSC analysis, which often 
leads to an error-prone correlation analysis.  
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As a consequence, it is well noted that incorporation of risk assessment into PSC is able to 
identify the potential hazards in PSC inspection and improve inspection efficiency. 
However, because of the lack of requiring big data for the safety condition of calling vessels, 
the interdependency among risk factors influencing PSC inspections is often ignored or 
difficult to explore in previous studies, demonstrating these research outputs are arguably 
not fully verified.  
This study aims to propose a Bayesian Networks (BNs) risk assessment model to 
investigate the dependency and interdependency among the influencing factors of PSC 
inspections, as well as identify and prioritize the most important critical factors for ship 
detention. To achieve this, the inspection database of seven Asian countries from 2014 to 
2017 in Tokyo MOU was collected. The parameters of the model are categorized into three 
sections, including: 1) the technical features of ship, such as the ship type, ship age, gross-
tonnage, flag of ship and classification society of ship; 2) the inspective activities, such as 
the type of inspection and place of inspection; and 3) the ship deficiency details (i.e. a total 
of 30 types of ship deficiencies), covering the safety, pollution and other requirements. The 
development, reasoning and validation of the PSC BNs model are realized through BNlearn 
software packages of R language and Netica. 
Additionally, the proposed model can predict the detention rate of an inspected ship under 
dynamic situations. For instance, when the deficiencies are observed in an inspection, a 
forward prediction of the ship’s detention probability could be done by taking into account 
of the existing status. Oppositely, if the ship is detained, a backward diagnosis can be 
conducted to suggest the status of technical features of the ships for efficient rectification 
when ship detention information is available. This is particularly useful for shipping 
companies and maritime service authorities to improve ships’ inspection performance as 
well as for port authorities to implement rational inspection policies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Through a rigorous literature review, 
Section 2 summaries the factors influencing PSC inspections, reviews risk analysis studies 
associated with PSC inspections, as well as analyses the applications of BNs in the 
maritime safety field. Section 3 presents the development process of data-driven PSC BNs. 
Research findings and discussion are described in Section 4. Finally, the recommendations 
and conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
  4 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Identification of the factors influencing PSC inspections 
As a favorable supplementary means to ensure maritime safety, the research on PSC 
inspections has attracted great attention from scholars. Clarke [10] firstly analyzed the 
responsible parties who should be blamed for substandard ships and the corresponding 
actions that need to be taken incorporate with them. Hare [19] studied the effectiveness 
and significance of PSC inspection in preventing substandard ships from participating in 
international trade. Later, the PSC mechanism research [32][23], legal issues of PSC [15], 
and the impact of the new inspection regime ([47][45]) promoted the development of a 
scientific and comprehensive PSC inspection procedure in practice. 
The influential factors in risk-based PSC are often associated with the pre-established 
safety standards, which serve as the principle for selecting substandard ships for 
inspections. Cariou et al. [5] applied the inspection database of the Indian Ocean MOU to 
analyze the evidence on the target factors used for PSC inspection. The main contributors 
to the ship detention were obtained, including the age and flag of ships. Later, they did 
further analysis to improve the selection process for port state authorities through 
quantitative regressions [6]. Knapp & Franses [24] considered the ship particulars, place 
of inspections and the index of ship deficiency to analyse the economic benefits of PSC 
inspection. The results showed that the combination of different data can effectively 
improve the effect of targeting substandard ships. As a relative consensus followed by port 
state authorities, the target factors usually contain the following three categories of 
information: 1) the technical features of vessels such as gross-tonnage, age and type of ship; 
2) the inspective activities including type of inspection and place of inspection; and 3) 
various inspected ship deficiencies.  
Among the factors influencing PSC inspection, scholars had shown a particular interest 
on ship deficiency. Cariou et al. [3] claimed that vessel age, vessel type and flag state 
were three main factors affecting the number of deficiencies. They latter applied 4080 
inspections records from the Swedish Maritime Administration to investigate the 
effectiveness of PSC inspections and found that 63% of the total number of deficiencies 
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was reduced during the next PSC inspection [4]. Unfortunately, the differences in the 
severity of these deficiencies were ignored in the study. For improving the performance 
of PSC inspections, Wolff and Cariou [44] tried to advocate increasing weights of the 
previous inspection factors. However, those previous studies revealed that the causal 
interrelationship among the deficiency remains unclear. On the basis of the above research, 
this paper takes the lead in bringing 30 types of deficiencies into the risk model of PSC 
inspection, in order to disclose the interdependency among the factors. 
2.2 Risk studies on PSC inspections 
Kara [22] assessed the risk value of each incoming ship across the Istanbul Strait by using 
the method of weighted points. It offered a scientific basis for the PSC inspections against 
the Black Sea MOU. The factors such as the performance of flag States, deficiencies index 
and accidents were taken into account in the calculation. However, the quantification and 
applications of the above factors were based on the experience of experts while the 
accuracy of the results was arguably not fully verified. 
To improve the accuracy of risk assessment for PSC inspections, Chi and Jun [9] proposed 
a new automatic optimization and self-evolution algorithm, which used the parameter 
redundant factors originally from a generalized additive model to predict the risk of 
incoming ships. Evaluation results showed that the ship targeting system could be 
automatically optimized. Xu et al. [46] considered both the historical inspections factors 
and generic factors of ships to build a ship risk assessment model based on support vector 
machine (SVM). As a result, the accuracy of risk analysis was greatly improved by the 
proposed model. Gao et al. [14] improved the ship selection process for port state 
authorities on the basis of a hybrid SVM and K-nearest neighbour (KNN) algorithm. Their 
results suggested that the combined algorithm was conductive in improving the service 
efficiency of PSC inspections. Chen et al. [8] utilized a Grey Rational Analysis (GRA) 
model with improved entropy weight to understand how much the varied factors influence 
the decision of ship detention under PSC. Despite showing some attractiveness, the above 
methodologies still exhibit some limitations in their practical applications from the 
perspective of dynamic prediction in uncertain environments. Further, most of the 
previous studies focused on the impact of influencing factors on the risk of ship detention, 
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while the analysis of the interaction among these factors was ignored. It leaves a research 
gap for revealing the cause-effect interactions in ship’s PSC inspection. 
2.3 Bayesian Networks (BNs) in PSC research 
Methodologies applied in the PSC relevant research had been growing over the past 
decades. They covers statistical methods (e.g. [5]), regression analysis (e.g. 
[24][25][18][6]), machine learning (e.g. [46][14]), and game model (e.g. [49][13]). 
However, as mentioned above, most of them were either often subjective or lacks the 
ability of undertaking dynamic analysis, while some were not capable of dealing with 
very complex systems.  
In recent years, a wider interest in the application of BNs into maritime safety analysis 
were evidenced by the fast-growing number of published studies. For instance, the 
maritime risk estimation [27][16][37]; and the maritime accident analysis 
[50][18][29][28]. As stated by Hänninen [18] that BNs are capable of representing 
complex and uncertain relationships between variables and providing the possibility of 
combining data with expert knowledge in addition to model updating as new evidence is 
acquired. Meanwhile, scholars also tried to integrate logistic regression (e.g.[27]) into 
BNs or suggest to construct the BN on the basis of data-driven (e.g. [51]) for alleviating 
the bias brought by the expert estimation. The Tree Augmented Naïve (TAN) Bayes 
classifier by Wang et al. [43] and the probabilistic approach for ship risk assessment by 
Dinis et al. [11] are the typical examples developed upon the PSC dataset. In light of this 
development, based on the PSC inspection database obtained from Paris MoU, Yang et 
al. [48] applied BNs to establish a risk assessment model. Although the result proved that 
BNs were effective in predicting the potential risk of an inspected ship, the influence of 
ship deficiency on detention was not addressed, leaving an important research gap to fill 
from a practical perspective. It is necessary to conduct a new study in which all the factors 
influencing PSC inspection (i.e. those mentioned in MOU) including both deficiency and 
detention are incorporated particularly given the significant impact of deficiency on the 
ship detention in PSC and the strong interest from shipowners on ship deficiency analysis 
for rectifications if their ships are in detention,. To do so, the dependency and 
interdependency among the variables requires a thorough analysis.  
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In light of the above analysis, the first innovative contribution of this study lies in its 
pioneering attempt of incorporating ship deficiency into the BNs-based risk analysis of 
PSC inspections. The correlation among the targeted factors as well as the ship detention 
probability in an uncertain environment could therefore be examined precisely. From an 
applied research perspective, this work pioneers the dynamic risk analysis of PSC 
inspection in Tokyo MoU areas. The findings can be used to conduct a comparative 
analysis to see the PSC inspection difference between Asia and EU which attracts the 
most dynamic risk-based PSC studies in the literature. They can also provide empirical 
evidence on the most important variables that PSC inspection focuses on when vessels 
visit Tokyo MOU ports.  
3. Methodology 
A risk-based BN for PSC is constructed to capture the dependencies and interdependencies 
among different risk factors influencing PSC inspections. Fig.1 shows the flowchart of the 
proposed methodology. 
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
The detailed description of the proposed methodology is presented as follows: 
3.1 Data  
This research uses a crawler program to collect a total of 46,496 records of PSC 
inspections of seven major Asian countries (i.e. China, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Vietnam) from 2014 to 2017 after the implementation of 
the PSC New Inspection Regime of Tokyo MOU. From such records, 38 factors 
influencing PSC inspections are identified and classified in three groups:1) the technical 
features of vessels (e.g. type of ship, age, gross-tonnage, ship flag, and classification 
society; 2) the inspective activities (e.g. type of inspection and place of inspection); and 
3) the ship deficiency details. In the ship deficiency group, 30 types of deficiencies are 
further divided into six categories including certificates & documentation, working and 
living conditions, labor conditions, pollution prevention, safety conditions and ISM, and 
others. 
In terms of variable status, ship types in this paper include general cargo/multipurpose 
 
  8 
ships, chemical tankers and bulk carriers. The ages of the ships are classified into 0-5, 5-
10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-25, 25-30 and over 30. Similarly, the factors of gross-tonnage, ship 
flag, classification society, type of inspection, place of inspection, ship deficiency details 
and their status learned from the data are clearly highlighted in Table 1. The statuses of 
all deficiencies are defined as either yes or no with respect to their natural feature.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 BNs learning 
Normally, a BN is constructed using human expert knowledge or subjective judgments. 
However, network construction and model parameterization process based on this 
approach is time consuming, and heavy emphasis is placed on experts to provide both 
the local probability parameters and dependency among the parameters, which may 
cause uncertainty and biases [43]. By taking advantage of abundant empirical data as 
mentioned above, this paper applies the data-driven based BNs learning method , which 
can reduce the dependence on subjective manners and produce more accurate and 
objective outputs. 
BNs learning generally consists of the following two processes, namely structure and 
parameter learning. The former is to determine the variables (nodes) related to the 
research target, while the latter is to configure the conditional probability table (CPT) of 
each node under a given BN structure. BNlearn is an R package which provides any 
combination of multiple learning algorithms included in the latest study, either network 
scores or conditional independence tests [36][31]. Meanwhile, it simplifies the analysis 
of the learned networks by providing a single object for all the algorithms and a set of 
utility functions to perform descriptive statistics and basic inference procedures [34][35]. 
Considering its versatility and practicality, this paper uses the BNlearn package to 
implement the BNs learning. 
3.2.1 Structure learning  
In the case of comprehensive database, a large number of BNs structure learning 
algorithms exist and could be divided into two categories: constraint-based methods and 
scoring-based methods [39][17]. The constraint-based methods aim to establish BNs that 
reflects the relationships among the variables to the greatest extent by discovering whether 
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they are dependent or independent. The scoring-based methods, which are used in 
conjunction with searching algorithms, score all possible network structures by setting a 
scoring function and then selecting the structure with the highest score. As the scoring-
based method is more convenient to obtain an optimal network structure with sufficient 
data (e.g. [42][48]), this paper uses a scoring-based algorithm to construct the risk-based 
BN. 
First of all, a Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scoring function is defined for the 
network, and in consequence the optimal network structure is found by the searching 
algorithm of hill climbing.  
BIC refers to the approximate calculation of the value of a boundary likelihood function 
under the premise of large sample data, and it is a commonly used scoring function in 
practice.  
Its formula is presented as follows: 




*),|(log)|(log                     (1)                                    
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*SDP  represents the matching degree between the structure S and data





 is the penalty term for a complex model in BIC scoring. d and n refers to the 
dimension of the Gaussian function and the sample size, respectively.  
A hill climbing algorithm is a mathematical optimization technique which belongs to the 
family of local searching [2]. It is an iterative algorithm that starts with an arbitrary 
solution to a problem, then attempts to find a better solution by making an incremental 
change to the solution. If the change does produce a better solution, another incremental 
change is consequently made to the new solution, and such a process continues until no 
further improvement could be made.  
3.2.2. Parameter learning 
Once the network structure is determined, the calculation of the CPTs of the parameters 
will be undertaken. Since the data obtained in this paper is complete, the Maximum 
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Likelihood Estimation (MLE) algorithm is used to calculate the network parameters [40].    
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where ijkm denotes the number of samples in which the value of the node iV  is k when 
the parent node takes the thj value combination, ijm shows the number of samples of all 
values of the node iV under the combination of the thj value of the parent nodes.  
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                   (3)                                                           
3.3 BNs reasoning 
In this paper, the ‘Junction Tree’ algorithm is adopted for probabilistic reasoning. The 
main idea is to transform a BN into a junction tree, and thereby to carry out probabilistic 
reasoning by defining the message transmission process in the junction tree [33]. A 
junction tree is defined as ），（ SCJT , where C  is a cluster of the junction tree, S is 
the segmentation set which exists between any two adjacent clusters iC  and jC .The 
junction tree algorithm propagates beliefs (or posteriors) over a junction tree when a new 
piece of evidence comes in so that the factors over the junction tree stay consistent with 
each other [52]. 
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is essential in this research for verifying the effectiveness of the 
proposed model quantitatively and determining the key factors influencing ship detention. 
During this process, mutual information is calculated to measure the mutual dependence 
between two random variables. The concept of mutual information is intricately linked to 
that of entropy of a random variable, which is a measure of unpredictability of the status, 
or equivalently of its average information content [16]. Considering a discrete random 
variable X with possible values { nxxx .....,, 21 } and probability mass function as )(XP , 
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where b is the base of the logarithm used, and it is generally valued as 2. 
Based on above theory, it is logical that the mutual information between ‘detention’ 















                    (5)                                    
),( DI represents the mutual information between ‘detention’ variable ( D ) and other 
inspections variables (  ) in BNs. The greater the value of mutual information, the 
stronger the relationship between  and D . The key factors influencing ship detention 
are therefore identified from the ranking of mutual information result. 
After the mutual information calculation is completed, another sensitivity analysis method, 
scenario simulation, was applied to further validate the rationality and reliability of the 
BN model. This method was proved to be a novel and effective model validation approach 
in the previous studies (Yang et al.,2018; Alyami et al., 2016). 
4. Results and analysis 
4.1. Model structure   
The network structure of this model is obtained from BNlearn package. It consists of 38 
nodes which represent the variables identified in Table 1 in Section 3.1.The 
interrelationships among the factors influencing PSC inspections are various and 
complicated. For example, the variable ‘type of inspection’ (i.e. V1) is the parent of 24 
other nodes, while the variable ‘place of inspection’ (i.e. V6) is the parent of 18 other 
nodes.  
Meanwhile, nearly one third of the variables of ship deficiencies are the child of either 
‘fire safety’ (i.e. V30) or ‘safety of navigation’ (i.e. V27), which means that the 
occurrence of many ship deficiencies is related to these two variables. On the contrary, 
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the node ‘Pollution prevention - Marpol annex III’ (i.e. V10) and ‘Pollution prevention - 
anti fouling’ (i.e. V14) are independent from any other variables in the model, and 
therefore they have no effect on other factors. 
In order to display the network more intuitively, the Netica software was used to present 
the model as shown in Figure 2.  
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
4.2 CPT calculation 
Due to the large number of nodes and their complicated relationships exhibited in the 
model, conditional probabilities are illustrated by setting the nodes of ‘gross-tonnage’, 
‘type of ship’, ‘flag of ship’ and ‘dangerous goods’ as examples. Others are calculated in 
a similar way. In regarding to the nodes’ probabilities of different status, ‘Gross-tonnage’ 
is a root node and directly obtained from the data. The conditional ones of ‘type of ship’, 
‘flag of ship’ and ‘dangerous goods’ are obtained via the ‘MLE’ algorithm (i.e. Equation 
3). The CPT of these four example nodes are shown in Tables 2 to 5, respectively. 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Model results and validation 
4.3.1. Model results 
Figure 3 shows the model result in a network with the marginal probability of each node. 
Accordingly, the predicted average ship detention rate is 2.05% which is harmony with 
the average ship detention rate (2.01%) of Tokyo MOU during the named period. This 
result partially helps validate the developed model.  
[Please insert Figure 3 here] 
There are more findings of real implications. For instance, nearly two-thirds of the PSC 
inspected ships in the Asia-Pacific areas are bulk carriers. Ships with a load capacity of 
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30,000 tons or more accounts for a large proportion (47.1%) of the inspections. 76.3% of 
the ships are subject to initial inspection. Meanwhile, ship’s safety condition still presents 
a major threat to maritime transportation and shipping companies need to strengthen the 
management of ship’s relevant safety risk. For example, among all the ship deficiencies, 
the ‘fire safety’, ‘safety of navigation’, ‘life-saving appliances’, ‘emergency systems’ and 
‘documents’ have high probabilities of occurrence. In addition, the impacts of the 
probabilities of occurrence of ‘MARPOL Annex II’, ‘MARPOL Annex III’, ‘anti-fouling’ 
and ‘minimum requirements for seafarers’ are relatively low, which indicates that most 
of the ships can meet the requirements of pollution prevention and seafarers regulations.  
4.3.2. Model validation 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted based on the ‘entropy’ theory to measure the 
interdependence among variables. In according to Equation (5), the mutual information 
between the ‘detention’ variable and all other 37 variables is computed, as shown in Table 
6. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
As shown above, the top eight influencing factors contributing to ship detention come 
from all the three categories. The top two belong to the inspective activities, namely ‘type 
of inspection’ and ‘place of inspection’, followed by the safety condition of ships 
including ‘safety of navigation’ and ‘fire safety’. The remaining four are ‘gross-tonnage’, 
‘type of ship’, ‘flag of ship’ and ‘classification society’, which all belong to the technical 
features of vessel. Moreover, the pollution prevention deficiencies such as the ‘Marpol 
annex I, II, III’ and ‘anti-fouling’ show less impact on detention. 
To reduce ship detention possibilities and improve the rationality of PSC inspections, the 
top eight factors mentioned above need more attention from both ship owners and port 
state authorities due to their high impacts on detention in order. 
After the mutual information calculation is completed, another sensitivity analysis method, 
scenario simulation, was applied to further verify the reliability of the BN model. This 
method was introduced in the studies of Yang et al.,(2018) and Alyami et al., (2016), and 
is being used as a new and effective method to verify the data-driven BN models. The 
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basic principle of the validation process is: if the proposed BN model is reasonable and 
logical, it must satisfy the following two axioms: 
Axiom 1. A slight increase/decrease in the prior probabilities of each parent node should 
certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the posterior probabilities 
of the child node. 
Axiom 2. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability variations 
from x attributes (evidence) on the values should be always greater than the one from the 
set of x-y (y ϵ x) attributes (sub-evidence). 
Table 7 shows the calculation results of scenario simulation, in which the first row of the 
table represents the original detention rate, while the rest of the table presents the updated 
detention rate by constantly changing the risk probability of each influencing factor. The 
comparison with the initial detention rate shows that the proposed model satisfies both 
Axiom 1 and Axiom 2, which proves that the proposed model is reasonable and reliable. 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
4.4 Useful insights for implications 
4.4.1 Dependency and interdependency among the factors influencing PSC 
inspections 
This section is to identify the factors that are interactive and to determine how these 
influential factors are causally related to each other.  
The technical features of vessels 
First of all, the variable of ‘gross-tonnage’ is a pure influential factor while arcs are 
originated from it to its child nodes. It influences other factors related to technical features 
of vessels (e.g. ‘type of ship’, ‘flag of ship’, ‘classification society’ and ‘vessel age’). When 
the status of ‘gross-tonnage’ is known, ‘type of ship’, ‘flag of ship’, ‘classification society’ 
and ‘vessel age’ variables are conditionally independent. Meanwhile, Table 6 shows that 
the ‘gross-tonnage’ variable is ranked as the 5th most influential factors affecting the 
inspection results, which indicates the importance of the ‘gross-tonnage’ in PSC 
inspections.  
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The inspective activities 
The two variables from the category of inspective activities, namely ‘type of inspection’ 
and ‘place of inspection’, have close relationships with other variables within the 
constructed network. Their child nodes cover almost all the factors, including certificates 
& documentation, working and living conditions, labor conditions, pollution prevention, 
safety conditions and ISM, and others. Hence, the occurrence of above deficiencies highly 
depends on the status of ‘type of inspection’ and ‘place of inspection’. For example, as 
shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively, when the ‘type of inspection’ node is set to ‘initial 
inspection’ or ‘follow-up inspection’ respectively, the corresponding results of the 
deficiency probabilities are completely different. In the former case, the occurrence 
probabilities of deficiencies such as ‘fire safety’, ‘safety of navigation’, ‘life-saving 
appliances’, ‘documents’ and ‘emergency systems’ are high. However, in contrast, the 
occurrence probabilities of most deficiencies will significantly decrease in the latter case. 
Specifically, the occurrence probability of ‘fire safety’ decreases from 24.2% to 1%. As a 
result, inspectors can make a rational decision, based on the specific inspection condition 
(i.e. initial or follow-up inspections), on how to prioritize their inspection items in PSC 
practice. The relationships among the factors influencing PSC inspections under dynamic 
environment can be effectively obtained in the same way via the model.  
[Please insert Figures 4 here] 
[Please insert Figures 5 here] 
The ship deficiencies 
The deficiencies relating to safety condition reveal strong interdependence, in particular 
the ‘safety of navigation’ and ‘fire safety’. As shown in Figure 6, the variables of 
‘Water/Weathertight conditions’, ‘Radio Communications’, ‘Life saving appliances’, ‘Fire 
safety’, ‘Structural Conditions’, ‘Cargo operations including equipment’ are all the 
children of ‘safety of navigation’, while ‘Water/Weathertight conditions’, ‘Emergency 
Systems’, ‘Propulsion and auxiliary machinery’, ‘Structural Conditions’ are children of 
‘Fire safety’ variable. If the ‘yes’ states of ‘safety of navigation’ is set to 100%, the 
occurrence probabilities of other deficiencies will significantly increase. For instance, the 
probability of ‘life saving appliances’ will increase from 15.5% to 40.2%.  
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[Please insert Figures 6 here] 
The ‘dangerous goods’ deficiency has a strong correlation with ship technical features, 
however, its occurrence probabilities against different ship types significantly vary. For 
example, the probability of dangerous goods deficiency occurred on chemical tankers is 
70.3%, while the ones on general cargo/multipurpose ships and bulk carriers are only 13.4% 
and 16.3%, respectively.  
The deficiency of ‘living conditions’ shows strong interdependency with the one of 
‘working conditions’. Once ship deficiency of ‘working conditions’ occurs, the 
occurrence probability of ‘living conditions’ will rapidly increase from 0.56% to 3.91%. 
Further, the occurrence of ‘working and living conditions’ deficiencies also depend on 
the status of ‘fire safety’ and ‘propulsion and auxiliary machinery’. This raises the 
importance of improving the ship’s facilities configuration. Similarly, ‘health protection, 
medical care, social security’ should be given high priority among four deficiencies of 
labor conditions, because its occurrence will affect the probability of ‘accommodation, 
recreational facilities, food and catering’ and ‘conditions of employment’. 
Unlike the above relationships, the node ‘Pollution prevention - Marpol annex III’ and 
‘Pollution prevention - anti fouling’ are independent from other factors in the network. 
Additionally, the probabilities of pollution prevention related deficiencies are generally 
small. For instance, the probabilities of ‘MARPOL Annex III’ and ‘anti-fouling’ are only 
0.025% and 0.034% respectively. Clearly, shipping companies’ safety awareness on 
pollution prevention is kept at a more satisfactory level compared to safety-oriented 
deficiencies.  
Ship detention 
The interdependence results between the influential factors and ship detention indicates 
that the probability of detention is highly affected by ‘gross-tonnage’, ‘type of ship’ and 
‘classification society’. In other words, the variation of detention possibilities at each port 
state authority can be explained by the different technical characteristics of ships calling 
at the corresponding port, rather than the differences caused by the specific inspections 
policies. This finding from Toyko MoU data is consistent with the research result from 
Cariou et al. [5] (using Paris MoU data). Detailed dependencies are illustrated in Figure 
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7. It is evident that the variables ‘type of inspection’, ‘place of inspection’, ‘safety of 
navigation’ and ‘fire safety’ are the parents of detention, which means they directly affect 
detention possibilities. Meanwhile, the above four variables are direct or indirect 
connected with ‘gross-tonnage’, ‘type of ship’ and ‘classification society’, indicating that 
detention possibilities have close relationship with the technical characteristics of ships. 
[Please insert Figure 7 here] 
In summary, the relationships among the variables could be effectively obtained through 
the developed model in this paper. It is necessary to emphasize that particular attention 
should be paid to the variables ‘gross-tonnage’, ‘type of inspection’, ‘place of inspection’, 
‘fire safety’, ‘safety of navigation’, ‘type of ship’, ‘classification society’, ‘working 
conditions’ and ‘labour conditions - health protection, medical care, social security’. It is 
because that the above-mentioned variables show stronger interconnection with other 
variables in the network and have higher impact on PSC inspection and detention. The 
quantitative impact of these variables on the target node is analysed and seen in Section 
4.3.2 (i.e. Table 7). 
 
4.4.2 Implementation in practice 
In practical operations, the proposed model can be used as a decision aid tool for PSC 
inspectors, ship owners and other relevant stakeholders. For example, a general 
cargo/multipurpose was inspected in Vietnam on 27th December 2016 and the specific 
inspection information was obtained as following: 
Type of inspection: follow-up inspection      
Gross-tonnage: 15000-20000     
Type of ship: General cargo/multipurpose      
Flag of ship: Liberia 
Classification society: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 
Place of inspection: Vietnam 
Vessel age: 15-20 
Deficiencies: no (no deficiencies from V8 to V37 occurred) 
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Figure 8 shows the application the above information in the proposed model. The result 
shows that the probability of ship detention is predicted as 0. It indicates that the ship is 
in a good condition and meets the PSC inspection standards with an extremely high 
probability and requires no need of inspection. In fact, this predication well reflects the 
actual inspection record at the time when vessel was inspected.   
[Please insert Figure 8 here] 
Similarly, a bulk carrier was inspected in Australia on 14
th 
June 2017, the specific inspection 
information was obtained as following: 
Type of inspection: initial inspection 
Grosstonnage: 35000 or more 
Type of ship: Bulk carrier 
Flag of ship: Hong Kong, China 
Classification society: Bureau Veritas 
Place of inspection: Australia 
Vessel age: 10-15 
Deficiencies: yes (ISM) 
The model result of the above inspection is shown in Figure 9. The ship detention rate is 
predicted to be 9.92%, which is nearly 5 times of the normal ship detention probability of 
2.05%. Meanwhile, it is much higher than that of the first case, which fully meets the PSC 
inspection standard. It means there will be hidden dangers when the ship continues to sail, 
and it must be detained. Consistent with the prediction results of the proposed model, the 
inspection records at that time showed that the ship was indeed detained.  
[Please insert Figure 9 here] 
In addition, the model could also assist to analyze the characteristics of detained ships. As 
shown in Figure 10, when the ‘place of inspection’ node is set to ‘Korea, Republic of ’ and 
the node ‘detention’ is set to ‘yes’, it can be seen from the updated result that, among the 
detained ships in Korea, Republic of, 67.8% were bulk carriers, 18.6% were general 
cargo/multipurpose, while the vessels above 35,000 tons occupies the largest proportion. 
Additionally, Panama (the flag of ship) and Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (the classification society) 
are the most preferable types selected by ship owners.  Among ship deficiencies, ‘Life 
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saving appliances’, ‘Emergency Systems’, ‘ISM’, ‘Working conditions’ and ‘Documents’ 
have higher occurrence probability than other deficiencies. Inspectors could better screen 
ships based on the characteristics of the detained ships calling at their ports to improve 
work efficiency and accuracy. 




Based on the PSC inspection data of seven Asian countries involving Tokyo MOU, this 
study proposes a BNs-based dynamic risk assessment model for analyzing the 
dependency and interdependency among the factors influencing PSC inspections. The 
results show that the constructed BNs model is effective in investigating the dependency 
and interdependency among the factors and identifying the most influential risk factors 
for ship detention. Furthermore, the prediction and cause-effect diagnosis of the detention 
probabilities of ships are carried out in a dynamic manner upon the available information 
in practical PSC operations. The paper pioneers the incorporation of 30 different types of 
deficiencies, as the key factors, in the ship detention risk model.  
Among the factors influencing PSC inspections, it is suggested that particular attention 
should be paid to  ‘gross-tonnage’, ‘type of inspection’, ‘place of inspection’, ‘fire 
safety’, ‘safety of navigation’, ‘type of ship’, ‘classification society’, ‘working conditions’ 
and ‘labour conditions - health protection, medical care, social security’. Furthermore, the 
difference of the detention probabilities consistently mirrors the difference of the 
technical characteristics of the investigated ships, rather than inspection policies.  
In terms of deficiency variables, the importance of ship safety condition related 
deficiencies are high. They have strong interdependence between each other. The 
occurrence of many deficiencies is due to ‘fire safety’ and ‘safety of navigation’. Shipping 
companies is therefore suggested to strengthen their safety management coping with these 
deficiencies.  
The proposed BN model is new in a sense of, for the first time, incorporating deficiency 
data into PSC risk assessment, and it has new findings contributing to the PSC literature 
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and generates significant implications in business practice, particularly in the Tokyo MoU 
region. Shipowners can use the model to assess the effect of different deficiencies on 
potential ship detention and rectify them precisely in a cost-effective manner. For 
shipping companies, it is beneficial to reduce the risk of detention as well as improve the 
company’s PSC inspection performance. On the other hand, this model can be sued to 
guide port state authorities to improve their PSC inspection policies for identifying high 
risk ships to further strengthen maritime safety. 
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